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CIVIL RIGHTS/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INDEBTED TO THE
STATE: HOW THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROMISE OF
ABOLITION HOLDS PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE MODERN
DEBTORS’ PRISONS

Sarah Morgan*
Cash-starved municipalities regularly impose criminal justice
debt on individuals too poor to pay. Local courts deny criminal
debtors’ a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay prior to
being assessed sky-high fees, often predictably resulting in
default on their payments. Nonpayment under these municipal
schemes is enforced through imprisonment solely for the
purpose of compelling repayment. Under these circumstances,
criminal debtors find themselves in modern debtors’ prisons, a
conceptual cycle of debt and imprisonment nearly impossible to
escape. This Note will argue the modern debtors’ prison is
peonage, coerced labor for the repayment of debt, which is
prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment and enforced
through the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867. This Note will consider
the current remedial scheme under the Anti-Peonage Act as a
potential remedy to the modern debtors’ prison and argue this
scheme is insufficient to protect low-income criminal debtors
from insidious municipal revenue collection practices. Further,
it will propose Congress should utilize its enforcement powers
within section two of the Thirteenth Amendment to enhance
existing private remedies under the Peonage Act, and
effectively dismantle the modern debtors’ prison.

INTRODUCTION
Set aside your image of a post-Obama color-blind America.1
* Candidate for J.D., 2017, Western New England University School of Law. I
appreciate the thoughtful and painstaking work of my colleagues on the Western New
England Law Review for their contributions to this Note. Additional thanks to
Professor Bruce Miller, for supervising the Note’s development, and Professors Erin
Buzuvis and Harris Freeman for their endless guidance. Finally, I am deeply grateful
for my ever-supportive loves, Kevin and Arden, who fulfil my life in myriad fun, silly,
and happy ways.
1. See generally Daniel Schorr, A New, ‘Post-Racial’ Political Era in America,
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Wipe clean your impression that the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960’s solved the “race problem.”2 And above all, suspend your
disbelief that the Emancipation Proclamation3 abolished slavery.4
For today’s social, political, and especially economic subjugation of
people of color flies in the face of America’s gauzy, race-neutral
ideations.5 Racism prevails, taking on new forms as implicit and
explicit biases against poor people of color, in the minds and hearts
of our political and judicial figures.6 And, as this Note will argue,
slavery continues in its new manifestation of the debtors’ prison,
although, absolutely none of this is truly “new.”
It begins with a minor offense: a moving violation, a citation
for jaywalking, or a parking ticket.7 Before a hearing for the
offense has even commenced, booking fees, bail, and defense
counsel application fees are attached.8 In other instances, it arises
post-conviction: monthly probation payments, installation costs for
an automobile interlock device, or required contribution for courtappointed counsel.9 To anyone with a steady income, a deep
savings account, or a financially prosperous personal network,
NPR
(Jan.
28,
2008,
4:00
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=18489466 [https://perma.cc/T2PZ-C599] (acknowledging the public
discourse surrounding President Obama’s 2008 election as potentially marking a new
“era” in race relations).
2. ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 10–11 (Princeton
U. Press 2009) (defining the modern race problem—post-Civil Rights Movement—as
racial inequality and disparate resource allocation, distinct from the post-Jim-Crow era
race problem which was marked by clunky attempts at equality and integration).
3. The Emancipation Proclamation, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/
[http://perma.cc/D84H-TZG7].
4. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Wholly Misunderstood Emancipation Proclamation,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2013) (describing Emancipation as a process of “integrating
African American as citizens of equal standing[,]” which “continues even today.”).
5. See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, The End of the Postracial Myth, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/20/magazine/
donald-trumps-america-iowa-race.html [https://perma.cc/N7DN-3V9N].
6. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT
BIAS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/Implicit%20Bias%20FAQs
%20rev.ashx [https://perma.cc/TM32-64L7 ].
7. See Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, AM. J.
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17840773
[http://perma.cc/AHZ5-ESKB].
8. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186–90 (2014).
9. Id. at 1190–96.
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these legal financial obligations10 (“LFOs”) represent nothing more
than a momentary hardship—write one check and all returns to
normal.11 For everyone else, the inability to scrounge up sums of
cash on the spot could result in an indefinite stay in the county jail,
for which additional fines and fees are compounded onto a growing
bill.12 This cycle, from the imposition of LFOs for non-violent
minor offenses to indefinite incarceration, repeats in municipalities
across the country in a conceptual confine known as the modern
debtors’ prison.13
This Note will argue that the modern debtors’ prison is
unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against involuntary servitude and peonage.14 Section II.A. will
argue that, in keeping with the expansive spirit of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the modern debtors’ prison is a violation of the
prohibition against peonage.15 Section II.B. will demonstrate that
the modern debtors’ prison is not exempt from the protections of
the Thirteenth Amendment, because the practices which give rise
to it do not constitute “punishment” as used in contemporary legal
discussion.16 Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment provides a
source of constitutionally-guaranteed rights from being subjected
to the modern debtors’ prison.
Section II.C. will explore the remedies available for violations
of constitutionally guaranteed rights to not be held to conditions of
peonage. In Section II.D., the Note will assert Congress should
take advantage of its broad enforcement powers under section two
of the Thirteenth Amendment and enact a prohibition against the
modern debtors’ prison, providing enhanced civil remedies for
imprisonment for criminal debts.17 Finally, Section II.D. will
address anticipated counterarguments: first, it will argue that City
10. Eric Balaban, Shining a Light into Dark Corners: A Practitioner’s Guide to
Successful Advocacy to Curb Debtor’s Prisons, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275, 275 (2014).
Legal financial obligations, or LFO’s, include “the fines and court costs associated with
a criminal conviction.” Id.
11. Id. at 276.
12. Logan & Wright, supra note 8 at 1192.
13. AM. C.L. UNION, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’
Prisons, AM. C.L. UNION 1, 10 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVF6-PZ5P] [hereinafter In for a Penny].
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
17. See id.
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of Boerne v. Flores18 does not restrict Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement powers, and; second, it will demonstrate
how federalism concerns do not preclude a remedial statute based
on the Thirteenth Amendment.
I.

DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN THE HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

Since the early days of this country, courts have operated as
revenue systems, squeezing precious dollars from the pockets of
the poorest individuals and imprisoning them for failure to pay.19
Existing judicial and legislative protections fail to prevent this
practice20—and, as this Note will argue, the time has come for a
new strategy.
In 1865, Congress passed the Thirteenth
Amendment as one of three Reconstruction Amendments.21 Its
purpose was to prohibit all forms of slavery and involuntary
servitude.22 One hundred fifty-one years and countless interpretive
challenges later, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a relevant
source of civil rights protection.23 It provides a source of
constitutionally-guaranteed rights which are immediately
enforceable against the modern debtors’ prison and has the power
to institutionalize long-term prohibition.24

18. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. See Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1180–85.
20. See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding
unconstitutional the practice of imprisoning defendants too poor to pay a fine); see also
Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR
(May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-courtruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons [http://perma.cc/F2WY-NZTT]; In for a
Penny, supra note 13, at 5 (2010).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV; see also Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U.L. REV.
77, 85–86 (2010) [hereinafter McAward 2010].
22. Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1337, 1338–39 (2009) [hereinafter Tsesis 2009].
23. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN
FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 92–93 (N.Y. U. Press, 2004) (arguing the Thirteenth
Amendment is currently underutilized as both a source of individual rights and for
Congressional authority, and thus, “the full wisdom of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
humanistic principles is yet to be tapped.”) [hereinafter TSESIS 2004].
24. Some scholars have argued the Thirteenth Amendment provides a source of
constitutional rights against debtors’ prisons as they arise out of civil debt, which is not
the focus of this Note. See materials infra note 52.
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A. Historical Debtors’ Prisons
Debtors’ prisons seen in the early days of the nation, carried
over from Britain, imprisoned a large population of colonial
Americans for their civil debts.25 Under this practice at common
law, a creditor first “stripped the debtor of his property,” and, “if
any portion of the claim remained unsatisfied, [threw] him into
prison and [kept] him there for life without food or clothing unless
he found means to discharge the obligation.”26 Faulty logic plagued
this institution, since, “if a debtor is unable to earn a sufficient
amount to pay his debts when at liberty to work, he certainly
cannot with such liberty withheld.”27 Creditors of civil debts had
the law, and the remedies it provided, on their side.28 The same
was true for criminal debts owed to the government—law
enforcement and court administrators had self-serving financial
incentives to draw people into the courts and collect fines and fees
from them.29
In the 1750s, a movement against debtors’ prisons emerged,
drawing parallels between imprisonment for debt and African
American slavery.30 Additionally, federal bankruptcy reform eased
some of the strain on struggling debtors.31 The federal backlash
against the debtors’ prisons spurred state constitutional and
statutory measures.32 Among their limitations, many of the state
constitutional provisions carved out exceptions for debts arising out
of crime, thereby limiting the protections only to those debts
arising out of contracts.33 Today’s de facto debtors’ prisons34 are
called such for their striking similarities to their institutionalized
25. Hampson, supra note 7, at 15–17. For an interesting article describing
English debtors’ prisons, see Philip Woodfine, Debtors, Prisons, and Petitions in
Eighteenth-Century England, in 30 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 1 (2006),
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/eighteenth-century_life/v030/30.2woodfine.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/R63S-UTWL].
26. S. F. Kneeland, The American Marshalsea, 1 COUNSELLOR 216, 217 (1891).
27. Id.
28. See Woodfine, supra note 25, at 4.
29. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1182.
30. Hampson, supra note 7, at 20.
31. Id. at 22–23.
32. Id. For a detailed analysis of utilizing state debtors’ prison bans to combat
the modern debtors’ prison, see HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASS’N, State Bans on
Debtors’ Prison and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024 (2016).
33. Hampson, supra note 7, at 27–28.
34. See infra Section II.B.
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predecessors.35 However, as this Note will argue, the modern
debtors’ prison more closely resembles another prohibited practice:
the unconstitutional institution of peonage.36
B.

Modern Debtors’ Prisons

The practice of employing courts as revenue generators has a
long history in both England and the United States.37 Likewise,
today, municipalities are focused heavily on their ever-depleting
coffers and use imprisonment for nonpayment of criminal debt to
enforce their fee schedules.38 Municipal courts around the country
impose fines, fees, or legal financial obligations (“LFOs”) on
people too poor to pay.39 These policies sweep poor people into a
cycle of indebtedness and imprisonment—the conceptual “modern
debtors’ prison”—that cannot be easily escaped.40 Unlike the
debtors’ prisons of yore, today’s debtors’ prisons bear a marked
distinction; rather than being standalone physical institutions
within which civil debtors of all races are held, those seen today
invisibly snare low-income individuals, primarily people of color, in
their grasp.
Alabama resident Ms. Gina Ray is one such individual who
was thrust into the modern debtors’ prison when, in 2009, she was
fined $179 for speeding.41 Next, her license was revoked when she
failed to appear in court after a miscommunication regarding her
court date.42 The next time Ms. Ray was pulled over, she was
35. See, e.g., Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 189, 202 (2016).
36. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002).
37. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1179–85; see supra Section I.A.
38. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 8–9.
39. See AM. C.L. UNION, Louisiana’s Debtors’ Prisons: An Appeal to Justice,
AM. C.L. UNION 5, 7 (2015), http://www.laaclu.org/resources/LADebtorsPrisons_
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/96NZ-279T] [hereinafter Louisiana’s DP]; In for a Penny,
supra note 13; see generally Alicia Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to
Reentry, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
G6CB-PDJW] (investigating the widespread use of municipal court fines and fees).
40. Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for
Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probationfees-multiply-as-companies-profit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/CTQ5M4P2].
41. Id.
42. Id.
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driving with a suspended license and assessed fees over $1,500.43
Unable to pay, she was jailed, charged for each day she spent
behind bars, and her debt was turned over to a private probation
company for collection.44 For a single speeding ticket, Ms. Ray
spent forty days in jail and accrued $3,170 in criminal justice debt
owed to a private corporation.45
Ms. Ray’s story is one of many around the country that
demonstrate the variety of ways the modern debtors’ prison
incapacitates individuals.46 This Section will describe several
salient features, which emerge across these stories, to define
distinct characteristics of the modern debtors’ prison.47 Often, an
individual is arrested or ticketed for a minor underlying offense
that would ordinarily carry no threat of imprisonment,48 for which
legal financial obligations are imposed without inquiry into the

43. Id.
Municipalities that employ these practices may have no public
transportation, or it may be unreliable or inaccessible. For individuals with these skyhigh court fees, driving without a license is sometimes unavoidable. Id.
44. Dozens of these for-profit corporations “operate in hundreds of courts” in
Georgia. Id.
45. See id.
46. See generally Bannon, supra note 39; In for a Penny, supra note 13. As of
this writing, municipalities around the country face civil rights suits for these practices,
including Ferguson and Jennings, Missouri; Jackson, Mississippi; New Orleans,
Louisiana; Rutherford County, Tennessee; Alexander City, Alabama; DeKalb County,
Georgia; and Biloxi, Missouri; more suits are filed on an almost weekly basis. See
generally Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSOJCG (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
kennedy_v._city_of_biloxi__complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YS3-RB69]; Class Action
Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-732, 2015 WL 5949208 (S.D. Miss. Oct.
9, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corrs., Inc., No. 3:15cv-01048, 2015 WL 5754498, (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2015); First Amended Class Action
Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 15-cv-4479 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015),
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/First-AmendedComplaint-9-22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EAV-WGBN]; Complaint, Foster v. City of
Alexander City, No. 3:15-cv-00647-WKW-SRW, 2015 WL 5256630, (M.D. Ala Sept. 8,
2015); Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 15-cv-253, 2015 WL
510270 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Jenkins v. City of Jennings,
No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA58-QVQP]; Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb Cty., No. 1:15-mi99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5W8-BN58].
47. See, e.g., Bannon, supra note 39.
48. Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1655
(2015).
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defendant’s ability to pay.49 Next, a low-income defendant is
typically jailed for the purpose of repaying their debt.50 Finally, the
modern debtors’ prison often has health, economic, community,
and racial impacts wider than the individual defendant.51
1. The Specifics about Court-Imposed LFOs and Their
Revenue Generating Purpose
The criminal justice costs, and LFOs, for which individuals are
jailed fall into several categories: fines, fees, and restitution.52 Fines
are statutorily-established monetary penalties imposed on
defendants as a condition of their sentence.53 Fines, combined with
fees,54 constitute large percentages of municipal government
budgets;55 aggressive law enforcement tactics are often employed to
garner arrests for petty offenses to meet the demand for revenue.56
“[A] government that can fob off costs on criminals has an
incentive to find criminals everywhere,” making the link between
See infra Sections I.B.1., I.B.2.
See infra Section I.B.3.
See infra Section I.B.4.
Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015, 7:15 AM), https:// www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/
debtors-prisons-then-and-now-faq [http://perma.cc/Q6R9-SDY9]. In addition to the
criminal justice LFOs, a second broad category of debts for which poor people are
imprisoned are civil “consumer” debts, “which indigent borrowers rely on but struggle
to repay.” Id. These debts are the worthy subject of study, but are outside the scope of
this Note. The focus here is criminal “legal debt [which] is particularly injurious,”
since, unlike civil debt, criminal debtors cannot discharge their LFO debt in
bankruptcy, and nonpayment “may trigger an arrest warrant, arrest, or incarceration.”
Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1763 (2010), http://
faculty.washington.edu/kbeckett/articles/AJS.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7CF-985A]. For
more information about the role civil debts play in the modern debtors’ prison, see
generally Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990); Richard E. James,
Note, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the
Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143 (2002); Zoë Elizabeth Lees, Note,
Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications in Payday Lending, 15
SCHOLAR 63 (2012); Ian Liberty, Note, From Debt Collection to Debt Slavery: How
the Modern Practice of Debt Collection is a Violation of the 13th Amendment’s
Prohibition on Involuntary Servitude, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 281 (2014).
53. Hager, supra note 52.
54. See infra Section I.B.1.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 77 and 78; In for a Penny, supra note 13, at
8–9.
56. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1194. Such tactics include “aggressive
towing for parking violations” and other traffic enforcement offenses. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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these policing tactics and revenue collection more than apparent.57
The second category of costs involves a court’s “user fees”
assessed to defendants either pre- or post-judgment.58 Before an
individual even appears in court,59 he may incur booking fees,60
probation-like deferred prosecutorial program fees,61 pre-trial
abatement,62 bail,63 and defense counsel fees.64
Fees assessed post-judgment include such costs as prosecution
65
fees, the per-diem cost of incarceration,66 and parole and
57. Id. at 1178. Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the first debtors’ prison suits
filed against many municipalities was in Ferguson, Missouri. Class Action Complaint,
Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-253, 2015 WL 510270 (E.D. Mo. 2015). It was in
Ferguson where a police officer encountered eighteen year-old Michael Brown
jaywalking in his neighborhood, which resulted in Brown being fatally shot. Jake
Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop [http://perma.cc/E5S3-9QA7]. This shooting sparked
nationwide riots and prompted the Department of Justice to investigate the Ferguson
police, which found Ferguson law enforcement prioritizes revenue generation at “every
stage of the enforcement process.” CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 9–10 (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGU5-AAR8] [hereinafter
FERGUSON REPORT].
58. See Hager, supra note 52; Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1193.
59. The deliberate use of the pronoun ‘he’ in this context represents the
overwhelming gender disparity in the criminal justice system. “[M]ales have made up
at least 85% of the total jail population” in the United States since 2000. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/jim14_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VAT-R6DV]. See Harris, supra
note 52, at 1760.
60. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1186.
61. Id. at 1187. These fees arise when a defendant agrees to complete a program
that the prosecutor recommends in return for deferred filing of charges against the
defendant—sometimes seen in “pre-trial diversion.” Id.
62. Id. at 1188. These payments are sometimes paid to police or courts to stop
the prosecution from proceeding, resulting in the charges being dropped and hidden
from a defendant’s criminal record. Id.
63. Id. at 1189. “Bail” is a money payment made to the court in exchange for
pre-trial release, which may be imposed in the discretion of the court and serves as a
promise to return for a later hearing. Id.
64. Id. Often defendants who qualify for court-appointed counsel must still pay
“an up-front ‘application’ fee or ‘co-payment’ for appointed counsel, in an amount tied
to the severity . . . of the charge.” Id. That is, if they are provided the opportunity to
apply for a defender. See Louisiana’s DP, supra note 39, at 8. See generally Beth A.
Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929 (2014).
65. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1190–92. State and local governments
attempt to recoup, from defendants, the costs of maintaining the system itself, such as
security personnel, court administration, laboratory costs, state pension funds, or
inmate medical facilities (regardless of whether the particular individual made use of
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probation costs.67 Many governments contract with for-profit
corporations, like Judicial Corrections Services68 and Sentinel
Offender Services,69 to provide private probation services (as is the
case in Ms. Ray’s hometown of Childersburg, Alabama).70
Through these arrangements, the probation company provides
probation services at no cost to the municipality; those services are
instead charged to defendants.71 When a defendant is unable to
pay up-front, probation companies will often enter into a long-term
payment arrangement, whereby the offender becomes indebted to
the company, rather than the municipality.72 The companies may
then add additional fees for supervisory services, which may change
on a whim since they are not subject to governmental oversight.73
such treatment). Id.
66. Forty-one states bill the cost of incarceration to inmates themselves. Hager,
supra note 52 (citing State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees
[https://perma.cc/
VB8X-NQFU]. See also Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1192; Bill P., Letter to the
Editor, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015, 11:49 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/letters/242-bill-p-letter-i-was-also-charged-approximately80-per-day [http://perma.cc/AK88-6X7A].
67. Forty-four states bill the cost of parole and probation to the offender.
Bronner, supra note 40; Hager, supra note 52 (citing State-by-State Court Fees, supra
note 66). See also Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1192.
68. About Us, JUDICIAL CORR. SERVS., https://www.judicialservices.com/aboutus/ [http://perma.cc/HA8Y-R5LY].
69. Partnering with Courts, SENTINEL, https://www.sentineladvantage.com/
partnering-with-courts/ [http://perma.cc/SR9D-N5YQ].
70. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1193. See also Bronner, supra note 40.
“The practice is particularly robust in the South—in Florida, Georgia, Alabama,
Tennessee and Mississippi—but has spread as far as Montana, Washington and Utah.”
Tierney Sneed, Private Misdemeanor Probation Industry Faces New Scrutiny, U.S.
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2015, 11:30 AM), http:/www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/06/
private-misdemeanor-probation-industry-faces-new-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/K4UQP2R8].
71. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 2–3 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TNW-4MSW].
72. Sneed, supra note 70. This arrangement relieves cash-strapped municipalities
who no longer need to expend public revenue for probation services—making this
transaction highly rewarding with little risk to the municipality. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 71, at 2–3. Because payment of fees remains a condition of
probation, the debtor, and indeed the debt itself, remains tied to the underlying
criminal offense, even though keeping up with payments of the “supervision” fee is
often the only thing keeping them from jail. Id.
73. Id. See also Bill Kimber, Lawsuit Against Childersburg May Go to Trial in
February 2016, DAILY HOME (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.annistonstar.com/
the_daily_home/dh_home_lead/article_5f7eef72-3afe-11e4-a1e6-dfeb5520806f.html
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Restitution, the third category of LFOs, is the defendant’s
payment to the victim of the offense for personal or property
damage,74 as a form of “making the victim whole” in the criminal
context.75 This Note does not focus on restitution, since it is
inherently connected to an individual’s offense, and is therefore a
component of their “punishment.”76
Fines and court user fees, identified previously as the “first”
and “second” category of LFOs, create the foundation of the
modern debtors’ prison. State and local governments, eager to
relieve taxpayers of burgeoning criminal justice costs, increasingly
turn to monetary penalties to satisfy the operational costs of their
criminal justice systems.77 Revenue collected from these fines and
fees constitutes massive portions of municipal budgets; for
example, in Austin, Texas, traffic fines comprised forty-five percent
of the city’s Municipal Court budget.78 A National Public Radio
(“NPR”) investigation into this practice found that nearly all states
have increased their court fees since 2010.79 Many of the fifteen
states identified in the NPR study imposed additional fees when
individuals failed to make payments toward their payment plans,
without
considering
the
individuals’
financial
status.80
[http:// perma.cc/2RZX-N8UY].
74. Hager, supra note 52.
75. See, e.g., CATHARINE M. GOODWIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
§ 6:21 GOAL IS TO RESTORE THE VICTIM (2016) (citing United States v. Ferdman, 779
F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, the principal aim of such restitution is to
ensure that crime victims, to the extent possible, are made whole for their losses.”)).
76. That is, for the purpose of a Thirteenth Amendment analysis. See infra
Section II.B.
77. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL:
PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT
THE POOR 2 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RLW-2YPV]; see supra text
accompanying notes 65–67.
78. ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA LASSITER, ALL. FOR A JUST SOC’Y,
DEBTORS’ PRISONS REDUX: HOW LEGAL LOOPHOLES LET COURTS ACROSS THE
COUNTRY CRIMINALIZE POVERTY 2 (2015), http://allianceforajustsociety.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Debtors-Prisons-Redux-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AEPJ37].
79. State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 66. Only three governments have not
shown an increase since 2010: Alaska, the District of Columbia, and North Dakota. Id.
Conversely, Florida added twenty new categories of LFOs and increased existing fees
in both 2008 and 2009. Bannon, supra note 39, at 7.
80. Bannon, supra note 39, at 17–18. The Brennan Center terms these fees—late
payment fees, collection fees the states authorize private collection agencies to recover,
and fees for entering into a payment plan—“poverty penalties,” because they
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Compounding the issue, many municipal courts fail to keep
adequate records of these collection schemes.81 This lack of
transparency makes it difficult for defendants to defend themselves
in court and for advocates to access the information they need to
evaluate the extent of the modern debtors’ prisons.82
2. Assessment of Fees Without a Meaningful Inquiry into a
Defendant’s Inability to Pay
Typically, in the modern debtors’ prison, courts impose LFOs
without assessing a defendant’s ability to pay.83 The Supreme
Court sought to curb the practice of incarcerating people for their
inability to pay criminal debts in the early eighties.84 In Bearden v.
Georgia,85 the defendant’s parole was revoked for failure to pay a
fine. The Court held that due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires courts to take into consideration a
defendant’s inability to pay.86 When bona fide efforts toward
repayment have been made, the state must seek other penal
methods87 and can only imprison a defendant who has shown a
willful refusal to pay.88 Combined with earlier holdings in Williams
v. Illinois89 and Tate v. Short,90 the Court has precluded lower
courts from discriminating against criminal defendants for their
inability to pay LFOs.91 These Fourteenth Amendment due
process protections, however, have failed to prevent the modern

“effectively penalize people solely for being poor.” Id.
81. Id. at 10–11.
82. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 40–41.
83. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1186–89; Bannon, supra note 39, at 13.
84. Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1200.
85. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
86. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983).
87. Despite this constitutional guarantee for meaningful alternatives to
imprisoning indigent defendants, the Brennan Center found that only twelve out of
fifteen states studied offered community service alternatives. Bannon, supra note 39, at
15. Some courts rarely converted LFOs into community service. Id.
88. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73.
89. 399 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1970) (holding the State may not imprison people
longer than the outer limits of incarceration it needs to “satisfy its penological interests
and policies” simply due to a defendant’s indigency).
90. 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding a State cannot convert a monetary sentence into
jail time simply because the defendant is indigent and cannot pay; the State must
choose an alternative enforcement method).
91. Balaban, supra note 10 at 275–76.
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debtors’ prison from emerging in many municipalities.92
For example, in the Superior Court of Benton County,
Washington, “the average LFO is $2540 [sic] per case,” which is
imposed without taking into account an individual’s ability to pay.93
The county offers community service as an alternative to
incarceration, but work crew participants are required to pay a
daily $5 participation fee up front—not a meaningful alternative.94
Additionally, the debtor can be thrown into jail for missing work
crew or even one payment.95
3. Imprisonment for Nonpayment—or Something Like That
Once fees are imposed on an individual unable to pay, he
usually defaults on his debt.96 Individuals who fall behind on
payment plans to private probation companies have their “freedom
contingent on paying those fees.”97 Courts have developed other
legal, although objectionable, means of navigating around Bearden
to permit imprisoning individuals for nonpayment.98 The most
egregious circumvention of Fourteenth Amendment guarantee is a
practice called “pay-or-stay.”99
Criminal debtors in these
jurisdictions are offered the option of either paying their debt in
full at the time of their hearing or “serv[ing] jail time to satisfy
debts.”100 Essentially, an indigent offender “volunteers” for jail
time as a means of repayment, where imprisonment for his failure
to pay would normally be prohibited on Equal Protection
92. See Shapiro, supra note 20; Balaban, supra note 10 at 275–76.
93. AM. C.L. UNION OF WASH., Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons: The Ways
Court-Imposed Debts Punish People for Being Poor, AM. C.L. UNION 4 (2014), https://
www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/media-legacy/attachments/Modern%20Day%
20Debtor%27s%20Prison%20Final%20%283%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SZZ-GYXG]
[hereinafter Washington’s DP]. Once assessed, the total LFO debt increases rapidly
“due to a 12% interest rate and added collection fees of $100 per year. A person
making $20 payments per month on an average case may be unable to pay off his LFO
debt even after decades of regular payment.” Id.
94. Id. at 9; Bannon, supra note 39, at 15.
95. Washington’s DP, supra note 93.
96. Id. at 9–10.
97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71, at 2–3.
98. For a discussion about the other three circumventions around the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibition—imprisonment for driving with a suspended license, failure to
appear, and contempt of court—see FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 4–
6.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id.
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grounds.101 For example, in Washington State, defendants are told
if they are unable to pay the full amount up front, each day they sit
in jail earns them credits toward their outstanding balance.102
Unfortunately, Washington is not alone in this practice.103
4. Racial and Economic Impacts of the Modern Debtors’
Prison
This unfortunate cycle has severe impacts on an individual’s
well-being, his family, and his community, which fall
disproportionately on individuals of color. For some individuals,
the modern debtors’ prison can exacerbate pre-existing mental and
physical health issues.104 Modern debtors’ prisons financially
burden whole families already struggling in economically
underdeveloped communities.105
This cycle also deprives
101. Id.
102. Id. See also In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10. That is, unless the offender
is imprisoned for nonpayment of superior court LFO’s. Washington’s DP, supra note
93, at 9. Some states impose additional per diem incarceration fees, which add to the
individual’s overall balance. See supra Bannon, supra note 39, at 23; supra text
accompanying note 66.
103. Kainaz Amaria et al., Profiles of Those Forced to ‘Pay or Stay’, NPR (May
19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/310710716/profiles-of-those-forcedto-pay-or-stay [https://perma.cc/WQ4Y-UGLB]; In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 9–10.
104. Lillian Thomas, Poor Health: Poverty and Scarce Resources in U.S. Cities;
Part One: The Problem, POST-GAZETTE.COM, http://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/
longform/stories/poorhealth/1/ [http://perma.cc/C2UH-VMC9]. In Jennings, Missouri,
another target of a debtors’ prison suit, jail conditions cause psychological and physical
damage. See Class Action Complaint at ¶ 3, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP]. Inmates have committed, and attempted, suicide in the Jennings jail
“after being confined solely because they did not have enough money to buy their
freedom.” Id.; see also Margaret Gillerman & Joel Currier, Jennings Hanging Attempt
is Latest in Series of Area Jail Incidents, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/jennings-hanging-attempt-islatest-in-series-of-area-jail/article_a62642ad-141b-5b5c-9881-6ec2a67290f8.html [http://
perma.cc/XL2X-NRKK]; Joseph Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees
Can Create Cycle of Poverty, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:38 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/09/384968360/jail-time-for-unpaidcourt-fines-and-fees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty
[http://perma.cc/KC8A-ZEKS];
Jessica Pishko, Locked Up for Being Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/locked-up-for-being-poor/386069/
[http://perma.cc/8NEC-HHHC].
105. When LFOs are imposed on individuals who are unable to pay, his or her
family faces a difficult choice: “[m]any poor defendants and their families prioritize
paying a fine in order to avoid incarceration, and to do so must forgo paying for
essentials such as rent or food.” Louisiana’s DP, supra note 39 at 6; see also Roopal
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communities of economic contributions to the labor market as
imprisonment disrupts an individual’s time spent in, or searching
for, gainful employment.106 Even with stable employment, legal
debt drains an individual’s long-term finances for decades to
come.107 Thus, the debtors’ prison undercuts criminal debtors’
abilities to work toward repayment and cripples their opportunities
for advancement.108 As a result, some individuals may turn, or
return, if the case may be, to engaging in criminal behavior as a way
to support themselves, their families, and to repay their LFOs.109
Municipalities focused entirely on generating revenue often
employ their police forces and court operations to collect from the
most vulnerable citizens, often poor people of color.110 In
Ferguson, Missouri, a 2015 Department of Justice investigation111
uncovered that African Americans were disproportionately more
likely to be ticketed and arrested for minor offenses, for which they
were sixty-eight percent less likely to have their charges
dismissed.112 The Ferguson debtors’ prison113 reflects the City’s
“unlawful bias against and stereotypes about African
Americans,”114 which demonstrates an unconstitutional violation of
their equal protection rights.115 This racial disparity characterizes
the modern debtors’ prison and, in essence, creates a “two-tiered
Patel & Meghna Philip, Criminal Justice Debt: A Toolkit for Action, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. 7 (2012), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/2012-Brennan-Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBF6-APB4].
106. Patel, supra note 105, at 6; see also Meredith Kleykamp et al., Wasting
Money, Wasting Lives: Calculating the Hidden Costs of Incarceration in New Jersey,
DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE 9 (2008), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
WMWL_Final_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6WL-RHU2]. Further, having an arrest,
conviction, or jail stay on a person’s record makes finding employment difficult.
Harris, supra note 52, at 1777–78. Only 48% of the Washington individuals involved in
this study were employed at the time. Id.
107. Harris, supra note 52, at 1776. Incarceration, even for three or four days,
forces already economically disadvantaged individuals to miss shifts at work or changes
their reputation in the workplace.
108. THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS
WHITE PAPER 25–26 (2014), http://03a5010.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/QP97-WCDP].
109. Harris, supra note 52, at 1785.
110. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 2–4.
111. See materials supra note 57 and accompanying text.
112. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 4–5.
113. Id. at 8–9.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id. at 63.
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system of justice” along racial lines.116
5. Reform Efforts: Litigation and Proposed Legislation
Civil rights advocates such as the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”), the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”),
and Equal Justice Under Law (“EJUL”) have seen some successes
in challenging the modern debtors’ prison on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment violations.117 In Montgomery, Alabama,
for example, EJUL obtained an injunction, and later, a settlement
with the City, which reformed the entire criminal justice system and
altered the City’s approach to criminal debtors.118
Following the publication of its Ferguson report,119 the
Department of Justice under the Obama administration announced
a package of resources to aid local reform efforts, including $2.5
million in competitive grants to “restructure the assessment and
enforcement of fines and fees.”120 The department also proposed
reform strategies founded on due process and equal protection
principles, including adhering to the Bearden rule and developing
meaningful alternatives to incarceration.121 However, reiteration of
116. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10; FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra
note 78, at 1.
117. See, e.g., SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, SPLC:
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2014/08/26/splc-lawsuit-closesdebtors’-prison-alabama-capital [http://perma.cc/G8SA-Z2NM].
118. See Shutting Down Debtors’ Prisons, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http://
equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-debtors-prisons/ [http:// perma.cc/
PV9B-HVXP.
119. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
120. Justice Department Announces Resources to Assist State and Local
Reform of Fine and Fee Practices, DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-resources-assist-stateand-local-reform-fine-and-fee-practices [http://perma.cc/45UW-7DCS]; see also Matt
Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Condemns Profit-Minded Court Policies Targeting the Poor,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/us/politics/justicedept-condemns-profit-minded-court-policies-targeting-the-poor.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/7CS5-QF3L].
121. See generally Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, Dear Colleague, DEP’T OF JUST.
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download [https://perma.cc/
7EYH-2YFQ]. The state of these efforts remains unclear in the early days of the
Trump administration, although on March 17, 2017, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights held a briefing assessing state and local fine and fee practices since the Obamaera Dear Colleague letter. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOTICE OF
COMMISSION
BRIEFING
AND
BUSINESS
MEETING
(Mar.
17,
2017),
http://www.usccr.gov/press/2017/03-17-Sunshine-Act-Notice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
D2RF-XBXV].
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pre-existing Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, which have failed
to prevent modern debtors’ prisons from emerging,122 provides no
guarantees of adequate protection from desperately underfunded
municipalities with deep-seated racial biases.123 As Congress’s
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause124 continue to be restricted through regressive Supreme
Court decisions, they will likely soon be unavailable as sources of
remedies for future violations.125
In January, 2016, Representative Mark Takano and civil rights
organizations such as the ACLU, SPLC, and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”),
advanced a bill called the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2016,”
which died in committee.126 If it had been enacted, the bill would
have withdrawn federal funding from states or municipalities that
contract with private probation companies127 as a means of
collecting unpaid fines and fees from “pay-only” probationers.128
This was a meaningful effort, which was the result of consistent
investigation and advocacy.129 However, this bill isolated only one
particular practice—states’ contracting with private probation
companies—that gives rise to the modern debtors’ prison, and, as
this Note argues, such attempts will not effectively dismantle the
full range of this complex institution.
The roots of the modern debtors’ prison are extensive and
require dynamic strategies capable of achieving systemic change.130
The Thirteenth Amendment, albeit currently underutilized in the
movement against the modern debtors’ prison, holds powerful
promises as a source of substantive rights and protections for

122. Shapiro, supra note 20.
123. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 4–7.
124. See infra note 150.
125. See infra Section II.D.3.
126. See generally End of Debtor’s Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 4364, 114th Cong.
(2016); Letter of Support for the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2016”, SPLC (Mar. 16,
2016),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/final_letter_of_support_for_the_
end_of_debtors_prison_act_of_2016.pdf [https:// perma.cc/P3Y5-H85J].
127. See supra Section I.B.1.
128. Defined as “an individual who is placed on probation due to the failure of
the individual to pay any part of a fine or fee imposed by a State or local court.” End
of Debtor’s Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 4364, 114th Cong. § 2(h)(2) (2016).
129. See generally Letter of Support for the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of
2016,” supra note 126.
130. See Atkinson, supra note 35, at 202.
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criminal debtors.131 The next Section will delve more deeply into
the law governing rights under the Thirteenth Amendment.
II.

THE HISTORY, PROMISES, AND IMPACT OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.132

Slavery in Confederate states was abolished on January 1,
1863, when President Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation.133 Ratified in 1865, section one of the Thirteenth
Amendment implemented emancipation throughout the United
States, and section two gave Congress powers to enforce section
one “by appropriate legislation.”134 The Thirteenth Amendment’s
immediate and prospective purpose was to uproot slavery, in all its
forms.135 The Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment included
slavery and involuntary servitude, both terms in need of
interpretation, allowing the Amendment to adapt and remain
flexible to new and unforeseen factual scenarios.136
Each
independent element of the Thirteenth Amendment—the promises
held within section one and section two’s grant of enforcement
powers—requires separate analyses.
A. Slavery under Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence
The “traditional form” of slavery, as it has existed in this
country, was the institution of chattel slavery perpetrated against
African American people.137 It was a characteristically brutal,

131. See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
133. The Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 3; McAward 2010, supra note
21, at 85.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
135. Tsesis 2009, supra note 22, at 1337–38; Joseph W. Mark, Comment, United
States v. Hatch: The Significance of the Thirteenth Amendment in Contemporary
American Jurisprudence, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 693, 697 (2014).
136. Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional
Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 374 (1995).
137. Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 869, 883 (2012).
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dehumanizing status of legal ownership that attached to a person
for life.138 Most notably, slavery effectuated the forced laborer’s
social death, meaning “the alienation or exclusion of the slave from
the community at large justified by the general unworthiness of the
slave.”139 Interpretations of “slavery” within the context of the
Thirteenth Amendment, however, struggled to determine whether
the legal institution of chattel slavery was a starting point for
applying the prohibition, or a limiting factor on what practices
could be prohibited as “slavery.”140
Early Supreme Court
interpretations, the Slaughter-House Cases141 and the Civil Rights
Cases,142 for example, rendered Congress’s section two
enforcement power under the Amendment weak and insufficient.143
Under these interpretations, Congress could determine the “badges
and incidents of slavery,”144 but only as they emerge through State
action perpetuating slavery.145
However, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court restored
Congress’s expansive power to “rationally . . . determine what are
138. Id. at 883–85.
139. Id. at 886 (arguing legal and social forces accomplish this consequence of
slavery—removing slaves from the community at large and imposing upon them a
badge of inferiority).
140. In other words, the debate has surrounded whether the practice at issue
must resemble “traditional” chattel slavery in order to trigger Thirteenth Amendment
protections, or if the Framers would have permitted Congress to consider practices
which radically differ from, albeit are analogous to, chattel slavery. See id. at 883.
141. 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (considering whether compelling butchers to work in
slaughterhouses was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment; concluding that it was
not). Here, the Court defines slavery as a “‘legalized social relation’ and just as quickly
found that slavery was over following the Civil War.” Armstrong, supra note 137, at
878.
142. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court in Civil Rights Cases decided neither the
Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment justified Congress’s enactment of section
one of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This provision entitled all persons, “regardless of
any previous condition of servitude,” the “full and equal enjoyment of” public sites of
amusement. Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 582–84 (2012) [hereinafter McAward 2012].
143. See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23, at 74.
144. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
145. See McAward 2012, supra note 142, at 582–83. Justice Harlan’s scalding
dissent demonstrated a much broader view of Congressional authority. He argued
Congress is “not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the
liberated race against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen,
where such discrimination is based upon race.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 37
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Tsesis 2009, supra note 22 at 1342; McAward 2012,
supra note 142, at 586–88.
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the badges and the incidents of slavery, and [conferred] the
authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation.”146
Under Jones, courts should simply defer to
Congress’s rational determination of the “badges and incidents of
slavery,”147 which, in practicality, extended Congress’s section two
enforcement power to bar “badges and incidents” of slavery in
public and private instances of racial discrimination.148 The Jones
rule has largely governed Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence to
this day,149 despite calls for more definitive guidance from the
Supreme Court.150

146. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
147 . Id. See also Mark, supra note 135, at 699.
148. Jones, 392 U.S. at 442–43 (“[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it
too is a relic of slavery.”).
149. In United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d. Cir. 2002), the court
interpreted Jones as allowing Congress to extend Thirteenth Amendment protections
to a broader range of activities than race-based slavery or involuntary servitude. In
Nelson, the defendants in a Jewish hate crime case questioned Congress’s authority to
enact 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) of the Hate Crimes Act. This section “makes it a
federal crime for a person (even if acting in a purely private capacity) to injure
someone else because of the victim’s race or religion and because the victim was
enjoying a public facility provided by any State or local government.” Nelson, 277 F.3d
at 174. The Court upheld the statute; it reasoned that the essential quality of slavery or
involuntary servitude, “the subjugation of one person to another by coercive means,”
can be effectuated on individuals irrespective of their race. Id. at 179.
150. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013)
condoned targeted racial violence as a rational determination of “badges and
incidents” of slavery within Congress’s power to regulate. See Mark, supra note 135, at
705. Specifically, the court upheld the Hate Crimes Act of 2009, which added racial
violence as an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 249. However, the court implored the
Supreme Court “to bring Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence in line with the
structural concerns that prompted limits . . . announced in City of Boerne, Lopez, and
Morrison,” all cases restraining Constitutionally-created Congressional enforcement
power. Mark, supra note 135, at 706. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (holding Congress was not permitted to enact the Violence Against Women
Act under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
passed under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, exceeded Congress’s
enforcement powers under the Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (holding that passage of the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an impermissible
reach of Congress under its Commerce Clause authority). At least two other Circuits
and one District Court have also upheld the racial violence provision of 18 U.S.C. § 249
under Jones, while echoing Hatch’s call for restrained Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power. See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 709 (2014); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Henery, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (D. Idaho 2014).
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Involuntary Servitude under Thirteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence

The Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary
servitude has also undergone interpretive challenges.151 Often
conflated, courts have long recognized that “[t]he words
involuntary servitude have a ‘larger meaning than slavery.’”152
Courts have attempted to define involuntary servitude primarily in
the criminal, rather than the civil context.153 The Supreme Court
held, in United States v. Kozminski,154
[a]bsent change by Congress, . . . for purposes of criminal
prosecution under § 241 or § 1584,155 the term “involuntary
servitude” necessarily means a condition of servitude in which
the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or
threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or
threat of coercion through the law or the legal process.156

151. See Kares, supra note 136, at 386–92.
152. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (quoting Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872)); Milwaukee v. Horvath, 143 N.W.2d 446, 448 (1966).
Although slavery and involuntary servitude are often conflated, involuntary servitude,
subtly distinguished from slavery, is “forced labor for the benefit of another.” See
Armstrong, supra note 137 (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)). In
other words, involuntary servitude originates out of extralegal methods—either
physical force or legal coercion—whereas the compulsion to labor in slavery originates
from and is reinforced by a legal framework. Id. at 882–86.
153. This is because statutes enforcing this Thirteenth Amendment prohibition
have criminalized activity that returns individuals to conditions of involuntary
servitude. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88; see also Kares, supra note 136, at 384–85. Courts
proclaim that the necessity of providing a criminal definition is because due process
requires notice of activities that carry criminal sanctions. United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931, 949–50 (1988); Kares, supra note 136, at 388.
154. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 241 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with constitutionallyguaranteed rights, including those provided in the Thirteenth Amendment, whereas
§ 1584 is intended to narrowly criminalize the holding of a person to involuntary
servitude. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 940.
156. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952 (reversing convictions for involuntary servitude
where defendants held two mentally handicapped farmworkers laboring “in poor
health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation” using psychological coercion).
This definition of involuntary servitude drew criticism from Justices Brennan and
Marshall, who would have preferred a definition of servitude focusing on the “slavelike
condition[s]” imposed, rather than the method of coercion. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 964
(Brennan, J., concurring); see William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth
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The Kozminski rule allows courts to determine whether the
conduct at issue imposes “‘slavelike’ conditions of servitude”
through “physical or legal coercion.”157
While this narrow
definition for purposes of criminal sanctions was not intended to
“define involuntary servitude in its constitutional sense,”158 lower
courts nevertheless regularly apply it in the civil context.159 This
involves considering whether the victim only had the choice
between performing the labor, or receiving physical or legal
sanctions.160
C.

The Thirteenth Amendment’s Exception for “Crimes Duly
Convicted”

The Thirteenth Amendment is not an absolute prohibition; its
exception allows for involuntary servitude or slavery “as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.”161 The Supreme Court has held that this exception does
not apply to laws that have regulatory, or non-punitive purposes.162
For example, collateral consequence laws, or regulatory sanctions,
which attach to criminal convictions163 and arguably effectuate a
similar social death as experienced in slavery164—such as sex
offender registration—do not constitute punishment.165 Simply

Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1311, 1337 (2007); Kares, supra note 136, at 389.
157. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 951 (emphasis added). A court cannot find non“slavelike” conditions so intolerable as to constitute involuntary servitude, as this
would impermissibly substitute the court’s “value judgment” for that of Congress. Id.
at 950. Nor does the rule allow for psychological coercion, which would hinge its
meaning “entirely upon the victim’s state of mind.” Id. at 949.
158. Kares, supra note 136, at 389 (emphasis omitted).
159. Id.
160. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District, 987 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1993).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
162. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003); see Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil
Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789,
1808 (2012).
163. See generally Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence—Understanding
Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 25 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/241927.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV4-6MJS].
164. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
165. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (holding registration systems for convicted sex
offenders is purely regulatory, not punitive, for purposes of the constitution’s
prohibition against retroactive punishment); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The Ironic
Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1180 (2013).
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having the mere presence of a deterrent purpose does not render
the sanctions criminal, since “[a]ny number of governmental
programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.”166
Therefore, it is unconstitutional if the State imposes slavery or
involuntary servitude on a defendant for a primary purpose other
than to further its punitive goals.167
D. The Practice of Peonage and the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867
Following the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery,
wealthy white plantation (and former slave) owners faced, among
others, an economic dilemma: how would they continue to
maintain their expansive farming enterprises, which designedly
required the exploitation of black labor?168 Under the vague
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude,
the institution of peonage arose as a means of sidestepping the
Amendment’s prohibition.169
Peonage is the voluntary or
involuntary arrangement to engage in compulsory service to
another for the repayment of debt.170
1. The Conduct of Peonage: Compulsory Labor
One solution to Southern plantation owners’ economic
dilemma171 was to coerce freed slaves into signing “lifetime” labor
contracts by the threat of torture and death.172 These labor
arrangements were flush with provisions nearly identical to those
conditions inherent in the institution of slavery.173 Freed Blacks in
Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
See Chin, supra note 162.
See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II
26–27 (Doubleday, 2008).
169. For a particularly thorough description of the historical and legal
background of peonage, see Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1609–26.
170. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
171. See Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1609–26.
172. See BLACKMON, supra note 168. A seedier intention may have existed;
“[b]ecause of the tremendous upheaval after freedom, both Southern planters and the
federal government believed that blacks needed close supervision.” PETE DANIEL,
THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901–1969 19 (U. Ill. Press
1972).
173. See BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 27. Although many of these contracts
were dissolved, they helped to form a tactical strategy of southern whites seeking to
regain their slave-labor base, and thus to return to their tremendous prosperity and
comfort of pre-war life. See id.
166.
167.
168.
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the South—especially formerly enslaved agricultural workers174—
hardly had another alternative than to agree to such contracts,
since Southern states passed vagrancy laws which required them to
prove their employment or risk imprisonment.175 Once convicted
and labeled a ‘criminal,’ the Thirteenth Amendment rights of
African Americans were essentially nullified, as involuntary
servitude was permissible “for crime[s] . . . duly convicted.”176
Submitting to these labor contracts voluntarily might have
appeared preferable compared to the cruel system of convict
leasing to which African Americans were subjected once
imprisoned.177 If not imprisoned and sold into forced labor to
private companies,178 black defendants facing fines for petty
offenses would agree to work for sureties, or, private employers
who satisfied their criminal debts.179
The prohibition against compulsory labor under the
Thirteenth Amendment, and as implemented by the Peonage Act,
indicated Congress sought to “maintain a system of completely free
and voluntary labor.”180 While some instances of forced labor were
constitutionally acceptable, such as penal labor,181 Congress
precluded a State from making joblessness an element of any
174. See DANIEL, supra note 172, at 19–20. This particular class of former
slaves, following Emancipation, had no land or capital with which to create their own
livelihoods. Id. at 20. Therefore, becoming indebted to a landowner from whom they
rented land for crops, or sharecropping contracts, became a prime opportunity for
economic prosperity. Id. Sharecropping contracts allowed a former slave to work a
parcel of land, and in return, would share portions of the crop with the supply merchant
or planter. Id. A sharecropper who received advances for his work would become
indebted to the landowner, which was considered a breach of his contract—a criminal
act at that time. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme
Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
646, 651 (1982).
175. Between the late 1860s and 1877, vagrancy laws sprung up in every
Southern state. BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 53. As an example, in Mississippi, an
1865 statute “required African American workers to enter into labor contracts with
white farmers by January 1 of every year or risk arrest.” Id. at 53; see also Birckhead,
supra note 48, at 1611 (chronicling the rise and breadth of these Black Codes).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Schmidt, supra note 174, at 649.
177. Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653.
178. BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 51–53.
179. Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653; DANIEL, supra note 172, at 19–20; see also
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 674–75 (M.D. Ala. 1903). Even child defendants processed
in probate court could be judicially returned to their former masters. Schmidt, supra
note 174, at 650.
180. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944).
181. See infra Section III.A.1.
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crime.182 Essentially, it is “beyond debate that no indebtedness
warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory
service” by virtue of these two federal laws.183
2. The Purpose of Peonage: Repayment of Debt
One fact existed universally: all were indebted to their masters.
This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their masters’
service . . . . Upon entering the new service, or while continuing
therein, the peon was held rigorously to fulfill his pledge and
render his labor so long as his debts remained, or an additional
one was incurred.184

Once indebted to these private employers, either by virtue of
voluntarily undertaking a labor contract185 or being involuntarily
thrust into a surety contract,186 the peon was compelled to labor
until his debt was liquidated—a task which often became
impossible due to endless additional debts tacked onto the peon’s
growing tab.187
3. The Enforcement of Peonage: Through Custom and Law
Although “true crime was almost trivial in most places,”188
Black Codes, and by extension, peonage, emerged during a
southern conservative “redemption” campaign, which sought to
reverse the movement toward equality.189 The campaign was
bolstered by the belief southern whites had in their proprietary
interest in their former slaves.190
Once created, peonage enlisted southern officers of the law, at
nearly every level, to replicate and enforce this system of pseudoenslavement.191 State legislatures in the South created laws
permitting arrest, fines, and imprisonment for petty misdemeanors
or breaches of labor contracts.192 Local sheriffs and justices of the
182. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; see Schmidt, supra note 174, at 649.
183. Id.
184. Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 (1857).
185. See supra text related to labor contracts accompanying note 172–73.
186. See supra text related to surety contracts accompanying note 179.
187. See Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653.
188. BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 69.
189. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 30–31 (The New Press, 2010).
190. Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1610.
191. Schmidt, supra note 174, at 650.
192. See Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1606.
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peace, entitled to partial payments of fees collected from
defendants, also implicated themselves in this system of perverse
incentives.193 Much more involved in debt enforcement than public
safety, law enforcement and judges operated as a team to provide
private companies with a supply of labor by way of surety
contracts, or convict leasing,194 and fill their coffers “with the
bounty extracted” from freed slaves-turned-peons.195
“Swift,
uncomplicated adjudication was the key to the system,” since,
revenue increased when defendants had limited, or no, access to
lawyers or information related to their debts.196
Additionally, once a person became a peon either voluntarily
or involuntarily, the law functioned as a trap, holding him to labor
until he satisfied the debt.197 Courts recognized the peon “could
not abandon the service and if he did, his master pursued,
reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience and labor again;”
returning peons to their creditors was encoded within state statutes
that criminalized the breach of these labor contracts.198
4. Backlash against Peonage: The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867
The institution of peonage, as assessed in 1846, trapped “a
large class of persons . . . who were not ‘of any particular color,
race, or caste.’”199 The Thirteenth Amendment, on its own, had
little teeth to curb this extensive practice.200 In response, the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, despite the Thirteenth Amendment

193. BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 61–69.
194. Id. at 65–66 (“Increasingly, it was a system driven not by any goal of
enforcement or public protection against serious offenses, but purely to generate fees
and claim bounties.”).
195. Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1624.
196. BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 66.
197. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
198. Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 (1857).
199. DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15. The system of peonage was not restricted to
former slaves, nor was it defined along racial lines. Peonage, developed in Spain, was
first practiced in the United States territory of New Mexico. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at
673–74. Freed slaves in the “cotton belt” were especially vulnerable to the practice due
to the “enduring plantation system” and the persistence of “[p]overty, illiteracy,” and
oppression within the southern states. DANIEL, supra note 172 at 21. See also
Hampson, supra note 7, at 30.
200. See Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually
Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2012).
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containing no reference to peonage,201 harnessed its section two
enforcement powers to pass the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867.202 The
civil provision forbids “[t]he holding of any person to service or
labor” and “declared null and void” any State laws that
“establish[ed], maintain[ed], or enforce[d], directly or indirectly,
the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as
peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation.”203 This civil
component was intended to prohibit, without any exception204
(unlike the Thirteenth Amendment), voluntary or involuntary
peonage.205 The criminal provision penalized individuals found
“hold[ing] or return[ing] any person to a condition of peonage, or
arrest[ing] any person with the intent of placing him in or returning
him to a condition of peonage.”206 Since the Peonage Act forbids
any compulsory labor for the purpose of repayment of debt, even
following a criminal conviction—in fact, raising a violation of the
Peonage Act was a valid defense to a state conviction for contract
breach207—under no circumstances may an individual be held in a
condition of peonage.208
III. MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS—MODERN VIOLATIONS OF
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE ANTI-PEONAGE ACT
Imprisonment to compel payment of costs is involuntary
servitude and repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the
201. Some interpretations call peonage a “classic example” of involuntary
servitude “whereby the poor were forced to labor until their debt was satisfied,” which
is therefore encompassed within the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
involuntary servitude. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 137, at 883–84; 45 AM. JUR 2D
Involuntary Servitude § 15 (2016); see also Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942);
Gross, supra note 52, at 178. Others conclude peonage is the condition of involuntary
servitude with the added element of performance for liquidation of debt. United States
v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 481 n.9 (2d Cir. 1964). In any case, the Peonage Act, in both
its criminal and civil provisions, has been widely held as a valid Congressional Act
under the Thirteenth Amendment.
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015). See also Soifer, supra note 200, at 1616–17;
McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 86–87.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015).
204. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676.
205. See Soifer, supra note 200, at 1618–19 (“The Peonage Act’s protections
even stretched beyond the traditional definition of peonage anchored in debt or
obligation; the new statute would also reach obligations ‘otherwise’ imposed.”). Id.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2015).
207. Schmidt, supra note 174, at 654. For other Peonage Act remedies, see infra
Section III.C.
208. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676.
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United States Constitution and thus is, in my considered
opinion, illegal. The lack of money, in and of itself, should
never be the cause of imprisonment in our humane society.209

The modern debtors’ prison forces individuals into a creditordebtor relationship with a municipality or a private probation
corporation that purchases the debt.210 Forced to repay their
indebtedness by any means necessary, criminal debtors are offered
no alternative but to satisfy their debt in state-prescribed forms of
labor. Failure to do so results in imprisonment. This is an
unconstitutional condition of peonage that is prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment and enforced through the Anti-Peonage
Act. Together, these laws promise a federally-guaranteed right to
be free from compulsory labor, and they must be called upon to
provide immediate remedies and a source of congressional action
to create lasting reform.
A. The Modern Debtors’ Prison is Peonage in Violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act
As explored in Section II.B., the modern debtors’ prison arises
in a multiplicity of ways that differ between each municipality in
which they exist. However, when considering the salient features
of each, it becomes clear that the modern debtors’ prison is an
impermissible and unconstitutional form of modern-day peonage.211
1. Individuals Caught in the Modern Debtors’ Prison are
Forced into Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor212 in the modern debtors prison is
performed in several ways.213 For individuals in a “pay-or-stay”
209. Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
210. See supra Section I.B.
211. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676; Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1655–62
(drawing parallels between the modern day debtors’ prison and the old form of
peonage in both the criminal justice and juvenile justice realm).
212. See supra Section I.C.4.a.; see also Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194
(1857); DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15–16.
213. This is distinguished from labor required of inmates in prison (“penal
labor”), where imprisonment is the statutorily imposed punishment for a crime—labor
being a component of that punishment. See, e.g., Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197
(9th Cir. 1963). Penal labor is a constitutionally permitted form of involuntary
servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception. See id. Alternatively, the
modern debtors’ prison presents a unique scenario where debt is imposed by virtue of
appearing as a criminal defendant for a minor municipal offense, and imprisonment or
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jurisdiction,214 the labor is a criminal debtor’s imprisonment (i.e.,
“sitting” off their debt), if they are unable to pay up front, which
essentially earns their freedom over time.215
In other
municipalities, jail time arbitrarily decreases fines and fees over
time.216 For example, in Jennings, Missouri, Ms. Allison Nelson
was put on a payment plan of $100 per month for fines and costs
from traffic tickets assessed with no meaningful inquiry into her
ability to pay;217 when she missed payments, she was imprisoned an
unspecified number of times between 2011 and 2013.218 On one of
these occasions, in November of 2013, jail staff told her she would
not be released unless she paid $1,000, which she told them she
could not pay.219 After four days, she was informed that her release
amount would be lowered to $100—the guard apparently felt
generous because it was Thanksgiving.220 Seeing “release amounts”
decrease over time indicates these individuals essentially buy
themselves closer to freedom the longer they stay in jail.221
For other individuals, being required to complete a mandatory
number of community service hours is a form of compulsory
“working off” LFO debt; failure to complete these hours, even if
they were imposed without regard to the likelihood they could be
completed, results in imprisonment.222 A particularly striking
parallel to earlier forms of peonage exists in Jackson, Mississippi,
community service is ordered as a form of repayment of that debt. See Atkinson, supra
note 35, at 202, 207.
214. See FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 6; supra text
accompanying note 99.
215. See Complaint at 9–10, Foster v. City of Alexander City, No. 3:15-cv-00647WKW (M.D. Ala Sept. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 5256630; Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb
Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5W8BN58].
216. See Class Action Complaint at 7–9, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv00252 (E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/
02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP].
217. See supra Section I.B.2.
218. Class Action Complaint at 26–28, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv00252 (E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/
02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP].
219. Id. at 27.
220. Id.
221. See supra Section I.B.3.
222. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 8–9; see supra Section I.B.2.
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where criminal debtors perform agricultural labor at the Penal
Farm to repay their LFOs.223 Criminal debtors there have the
“choice” to “sit out” their debt in the Hinds County Jail for twentyfive dollars per day, or “work off” their debts at the Penal Farm for
fifty-eight dollars per day.224
Other criminal debtors are on payment plans and must work
to repay their debts to either the municipality or a private
probation corporation; falling behind by even one payment results
in threats of, or actual, imprisonment.225 One such individual, Mr.
Reynaud Variste in New Orleans, Louisiana, managed to pay down
his $1600 court fees to $700 over several years, but when his
construction work slowed and he fell behind, police officers armed
with assault rifles raided his family home and arrested him for
overdue court fees.226 For three days he sat in jail until his
girlfriend relinquished his entire paycheck to the Collections
Department to pay his LFO balance.227
Criminal debtors are offered no alternative but repayment of
LFO debt by one of these various forms of “labor.” They are not
afforded an opportunity to waive fees due to their indigency;228 they
are not offered reasonable community service alternatives to
incarceration;229 no opportunity exists to create a reasonable
payment plan based on their income.230 Clearly municipalities
engaging in these practices have violated the heart of criminal
debtors’ right to be free from compulsory labor. Labor is required
to satisfy LFO debts; failure to do so is a criminal act.231
It may be tempting to identify elements of “choice” in the
aforementioned stories. For example, in Jackson, individuals may
choose to “sit off” their fees in jail or work at the Penal Farm, opt

223. See generally Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208.
224. Id. at 2–3.
225. See, e.g., SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, supra
note 117.
226. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans at 14–
15,
No.
2:15-cv-04479-SSV-JCW
(E.D.
La.
Sept.
21,
2015),
http://
equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/First-Amended-Complaint-922-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EAV-WGBN].
227. Id.
228. Bannon, supra note 39, at 13.
229. Id. at 15–17.
230. Id. at 14–15.
231. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); see supra Section I.B.3.
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to receive 500 hours of community service, or set up a payment
plan to satisfy LFO debt incrementally over time.232 Faced with
insurmountable fees and endless threats of being jailed for
nonpayment, the choice to pay court fees, by any means necessary,
over basic necessities is no choice at all.233 Under the prohibition
against peonage, however, whether compulsory labor is voluntary
or involuntary is of no consequence; any compulsory labor to
liquidate debt is exhaustively prohibited.234
2. The Purpose of Compulsory Labor in the Modern
Debtors’ Prison is Repayment of Debt
The purpose of labor in the modern debtors’ prison scheme, as
discussed above, is to satisfy the indebtedness to the creditor.235
Starved-for-cash, municipalities exploit low-income people through
their criminal justice fine and fee schedules. The underlying basis
of the fine and fee schedules is to fill drained local coffers, not to
enforce its criminal provisions or to serve a legitimate purpose of
punishment.236
Imprisonment is not imposed in the debtors’ prison because it
fulfills the municipality’s need to punish citizens for their crimes,
which would be constitutional.237 Instead, the imprisonment is
intended to satisfy the debt or to compel the debtor to seek his
outside resources to repay the debt.238 Under this system, serving
time takes on a new meaning—rather than repaying one’s debt to
society, a valid form of punishment,239 the criminal debtor serves
his time for the economic benefit of the municipal body to which he
232. See generally Class Action Complaint at 6, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15cv-732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208.
233. “I’ve had judges tell me that they don’t care what my other obligations are,
LFOs come first. First before anything. First before food and shelter,” stated David
Ramirez, a father of four supporting his family on his sole income from public
assistance. Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 13.
234. See supra Section II.D.4.
235. See Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 8–9.
236. See Bronner, supra note 40.
237. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
238. For example, Ms. Samantha Jenkins, a forty-seven-year-old mother of six
relied on her family to borrow and raise $300 from “friends and relatives to buy her out
of jail.” Class Action Complaint at 8, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252
(E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA58QVQP].
239. See, e.g., Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963).
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is indebted.240 Community service, rather than providing an
alternative to repayment, serves essentially the same function of
repaying debt solely intended to fill local coffers.241 Whether the
municipality retains the debt or a private probation corporation has
purchased it, failure to repay the creditor results in imprisonment
until it is “paid off.”242 The prohibition against peonage forbids
compulsory labor to satisfy indebtedness, and thus prohibits
municipalities from relying on criminal debtors for their labor.243
3. The Enforcement of the Modern Debtors’ Prison through
Custom and Law
The criminal debtor’s status as a peon is enforced by the full
force of the municipal legal system, which takes no accounting of
his ability to repay his debt.244 Salient throughout these stories is a
recurring theme, and one which is characteristic of the modern
debtors’ prison:245 criminal debtors in these municipalities are
denied basic due process rights, including the opportunity to be
heard on their inability to pay.246 Similar to the original system of
peonage,247 in the modern debtors’ prison, municipalities maximize
their revenue collection when defendants are not provided an
attorney or cost prohibits them from obtaining counsel.248
240. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 9. Municipalities persist in this practice
despite the cost of incarcerating criminal debtors in the modern debtors’ prison
outweighing the revenue generated. In Pennsylvania, inmates “who are eligible for
release but are kept in prison based on their inability to pay a $60 fee” cost “nearly
$100 per day” to confine. Patel, supra note 105, at 6. One county in North Carolina
“arrested 564 people because they fell behind on debt; the County jailed 246 debtors
who did not pay for an average of 4 days. The county collected $33,476 while the jail
term itself cost $40,000—a loss for the county of $6,524.” Id.
241. See Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 9.
242. In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10; see supra Part I.B.3.
243. See supra Section II.D.4.
244. See supra Section II.D.3.
245. See supra Section I.B.2.
246. See Class Action Complaint at 27, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv00252
(E.D.
Mo.
Feb.
8,
2015),
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA58-QVQP]; Complaint, Foster v. City of Alexander City at 9–10,
No. 3:15-cv-647-WKW (M.D. Ala Sept. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 5256630; Complaint,
Thompson v. DeKalb Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5W8-BN58]; see generally Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of
Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208.
247. See supra Section I.C.4.c.
248. See Patel, supra note 105, at 6; supra text accompanying note 64.
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The institution of peonage did not exist in a vacuum; it
emerged from the Southern white conservatives’ reaction to the
perceived threat emancipation and Reconstruction posed their
power and affluence.249 Likewise, the modern debtors’ prison
cannot be separated from the contemporary context in which it
arose.250 The system of mass incarceration of primarily African
American men, to which the modern debtors’ prison contributes,251
has become a palatable reality for many Americans partly because
of anti-black sentiment,252 which, if not created, was reinforced by a
highly effective media campaign in the 1980s.253 Mass incarceration
has normalized jailing millions of people,254 primarily low-income
African American men,255 and supported public opinion that is
both highly punitive and highly racialized.256 As fear and anxiety
about drug crime grew, so too did the prison population.257 With
this as its contemporary backdrop, the modern debtors’ prison is
highly racialized, targets indigent defendants, and seems to exist in
many, albeit not exclusively, Southern states where peonage
previously thrived.258 These noticeable parallels aside, the practice
of peonage as prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Peonage Act does not depend on racial discrimination or
disproportionate impacts.259 As such, the modern debtors’ prison is
impermissible under these prohibitions.
B.

The Modern Debtors’ Prison is Not Exempt from Thirteenth
Amendment Protection

The Peonage Act on its own prohibits any compulsory labor
for the purpose of repayment of debt.260 The practice of peonage,
249. See supra Section I.B.4.c.
250. See Hager, supra note 52.
251. ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 154–57.
252. Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Racialized Mass Incarceration:
Poverty, Prejudice, and Punishment, in DOING RACE: 21 ESSAYS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 349 (Hazel R. Markus & Paula Moya, eds., New York: Norton 2010), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/bobo/files/2010_racialized_mass_incarceration_doing_race.pd
f [https://perma.cc/HH2U-NRMT].
253. ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 52–53.
254. Id. at 178–80.
255. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 7; see supra note 57.
256. Bobo, supra note 252, at 349.
257. ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 105–06.
258. See DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15–16.
259. See supra Section II.A.
260. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
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however, is often considered a subset of involuntary servitude
under the Thirteenth Amendment, subject to its punishment
exemption.261 Imprisonment for nonpayment of LFOs, rather than
as punishment for the underlying offense, does not serve a punitive
purpose and is therefore not exempt from protection under the
Amendment.262 The Department of Justice has acknowledged,
generally, that the concerted practices of police and courts “are
geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward
raising”263 and maximizing revenue at every stage of the criminal
justice process, as in Ferguson.264 Since States have non-punitive
purposes for these practices, they are constitutionally prohibited
from imprisoning individuals for nonpayment of LFO debt.
Several state courts have agreed with this reasoning. In 1969,
the Tennessee District Court voided a Tennessee statute, which
permitted imprisonment for nonpayment of debt as a Thirteenth
Amendment violation.265 It found that “costs are treated both
substantively and procedurally in a manner inconsistent with the
261. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see supra text
accompanying note 206. This means that it is necessary to demonstrate how debtors’
prisons are not exempt from Thirteenth Amendment protections.
262. See Henderson, supra note 165, at 1180 (arguing the “Punishment Clause
provides an exception only ‘as a punishment for crime,’ and not for civil, regulatory, or
private discriminatory treatment of formerly convicted people.”). Professor Birckhead
in The New Peonage has also argued that practices underpinning the modern debtors’
prison do not fit within the exception because criminal debtors “have not, in fact, been
‘duly convicted,’ as ‘duly’ is defined as ‘correctly, fairly, legitimately, as required, or
rightfully.” Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1638. Likewise, the meaning of “duly” could
derive from “due process,” meaning the labor could only be coerced if the defendant
were convicted of a “crime duly proved and adjudged.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36, 50 (1872) (emphasis added). Since Bearden and its progeny establish due
process protections which require courts provide a hearing on the defendant’s ability to
pay, another argument that poor criminal defendants are not “duly convicted” for their
inability to pay is the lack of due process afforded to them by the municipal court. See
Section I.B.2.
263. Gupta & Foster, supra note 121, at 2.
264. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 13.
265. See generally Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969)
(finding defendant’s imprisonment for failure to pay $892.38 court costs—spent
working off costs for an additional eleven months after completing his sentence for
three criminal convictions—involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment). Shortly after this ruling, combined with a previous decision from the
same court, Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), prompted the state
legislature to forbid imprisonment for nonpayment of LFO’s. Walter Kurtz, Pay or
Stay: Incarceration of Minor Criminal Offenders for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees, 51
TENN. B.J. 16, 18 (2015), http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/journal_archives/2015/
TBJ0715.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8SK-LURG].
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punishment theory.”266 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia reasoned that “costs assessed against a person who has
been convicted of a crime are not part of his punishment for the
crime,”267 and rejected its comparable state law in 1968.
These cases additionally demonstrate the power of challenging
the modern debtors’ prisons under the Thirteenth Amendment.268
The Fourteenth Amendment protections under Bearden have
failed to adequately protect against the emergence of modern
debtors’ prison.269 Since the practice is peonage and is not imposed
for punishment, the time has come for a new challenge to a very
old practice—one the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits, if not by
design, then within its foresight.
C.

Remedies Available for Violations of Rights under the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act

The modern debtors’ prison is peonage as prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Peonage Act; therefore, remedies
for violations of those rights exist.270 Prior to the passage of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003
(“TVPRA”),271 plaintiffs attempting to plead their case under the
Thirteenth Amendment or the Anti-Peonage Act faced difficulty
convincing courts they provided an implied right of action.272

266. Anderson, 300 F. Supp. at 792.
267. Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Va. 1968) (emphasis added). For
other states in agreement, see State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 93 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn.
1935) (determining that after entering nolle prosequi, the defendant stood uncharged
with any crime and therefore any imprisonment was unlawful unless he consented—
even consenting to involuntary servitude without a conviction is forbidden by
Thirteenth Amendment.). But see Milwaukee v. Horvath, 143 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1966)
(holding that imprisonment for failure to pay a fine does not constitute involuntary
servitude because imprisonment alone is not servitude; further, adopting defendant’s
reasoning would mean that anyone who qualifies as indigent could violate city
ordinances with impunity).
268. See generally Anderson, 300 F. Supp. at 789; Wright, 163 S.E.2d 158.
269. See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Birckhead, supra
note 48, at 1635 (“In the years since Bearden, courts frequently have either ignored
these constitutional protections or developed strategies to skirt their edges.”).
270. See Kares, supra note 136, at 380–85.
271. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 18, 22 U.S.C.).
272. Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil
Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1663
(2007).
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Neither the civil273—which invalidated State laws permitting
peonage—nor the criminal274 provision of the Peonage Act
mentioned remedies. Courts generally followed the guidance of
Turner v. Unification Church275to find no implied right of action for
violations of either the criminal prohibition against involuntary
servitude or peonage.276 With TVPRA’s passage, Congress made a
private right of action available for the various sections of criminal
provisions in Chapter 77 of Title 18, such as peonage,277 sale into
involuntary servitude,278 seizure, detention, transportation or sale
of slaves,279 and trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or forced labor.280 The private right of
action, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1595, now allows victims to recover
damages and attorneys’ fees against “the perpetrator (or whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should
have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter).”281
A plaintiff is also entitled to mandatory restitution for the full
amount of his or her losses.282
Congress signaled its intent to provide a remedy for victims of
peonage and involuntary servitude with the passage of the
TVPRA.283 This relieved a plaintiff from having to prove an
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015); see supra note 199 and accompanying text. Prior to
the TVPRA, the civil remedies portion only offered remedies for limited provisions
within the civil code; the anti-peonage section was not included.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2015).
275. 473 F.Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978); see Nam, supra note 272, at 1663 n.47.
276. Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F.Supp. 367, 374 (D.R.I. 1978) (refusing
to apply the rationale of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to the Thirteenth Amendment and the criminal antipeonage provision, for which state tort law provided adequate remedies); see also
Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action:
Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
26–29 (2004).
277. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2015).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2015).
279. 18 U.S.C. § 1585 (2015).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2015).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015).
282. 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2015).
283. Judicial interpretations of federal law will assess whether Congress intended
“to create not just a private right but a private remedy.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
15 (1979)). Where Congress includes an “express provision of one method of enforcing
a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.” Id. at 290. The
TVPRA expressly provides for a civil action, for which a plaintiff can receive monetary
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implied private right of action for violations of involuntary
servitude or peonage.284 Since the remedy is provided in the
statutory scheme, Congress has foreclosed other remedies for such
violations.285 This includes bringing a civil action for deprivation of
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.286 Therefore, the sole remedy
available for victims of peonage and involuntary servitude exists
within the criminal anti-involuntary servitude and peonage
statute.287
D. Congressional Enforcement Power of Thirteenth Amendment
Must Be Harnessed as a Remedy Against the Modern
Debtors’ Prison
The 1867 Congress thought it prudent to harness its newly
granted Thirteenth Amendment powers to curb the practice of
peonage where it emerged, in passing the Peonage Act.288
Likewise, this source of authority provides Congress with an
important tool it could use to expand the remedial scheme under
the Anti-Peonage Act and thoroughly abolish the modern debtors’
prison.289 To enact this systemic change, Congress should use its
enforcement authority, under section two of the Thirteenth
Amendment, to pass remedial legislation prohibiting imprisonment
for nonpayment of debt as a violation of the prohibition against
peonage and involuntary servitude.290
Congress has the means to define practices that violate the
provisions against involuntary servitude and peonage in the

damages, attorney’s fees, and restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2015); Nam, supra note
272, at 1665.
284. Hernandez v. Attisha, No. 09-CV-2257-IEG (WMC), 2010 WL 816160, at
*2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010); Nam, supra note 272, at 1663.
285. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290.
286. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 365 (1992) (“[Section] 1983 is not
available to enforce a violation of a federal statute ‘where Congress has foreclosed such
enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself . . . .’”) (Blackmun J., dissenting)
(quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987)).
287. Typically, there can be no private causes of action inferred from a criminal
statute, but “that is irrelevant where Congress” has expressly provided for one.
Hernandez, 2010 WL 816160, at *3.
288. See Soifer, supra note 200, at 1616–17.
289. See In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 5.
290. See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23, at 92–93.
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Thirteenth Amendment and legislate to prohibit such practices.291
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment292 and the Commerce Clause,293
which have each justified civil rights statutes, the Thirteenth
Amendment’s scope has not been subject to recent restrictions.294
Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment holds a uniquely farreaching enforcement power and should be harnessed to prevent
the modern debtors’ prisons from trapping individuals in a modern
system of peonage.295
1. The City of Boerne “Congruence and Proportionality”
Rule Does Not Apply to the Thirteenth Amendment
Thirteenth Amendment scholars debate as to what, exactly,
the Thirteenth Amendment and Jones permit Congress to do in
interpreting the “badges and incidents” of slavery.296 Concern is
especially heightened since the Supreme Court’s restriction of
Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a sister Reconstruction amendment.297 In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Court limited the Fourteenth Amendment
“remedial” powers of Congress only to “‘enforc[ing]’ the
provisions” it has been given, “not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation.”298 When Congress passes
preventative remedial measures, “[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.”299
The Court has avoided resolving the question of whether City

291. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
292. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
294. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (reaffirming that
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is “not without effective bounds”) (citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 519–20 (1997) (restricting Congress’s power to legislate under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce only those rights the Court determined are within its scope).
295. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1905) (quoting Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)) (“Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to
meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by [the Thirteenth
Amendment].”).
296. Carter, supra note 156, at 1314.
297. See generally McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 77.
298. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–19 (1997).
299. Id. at 520. In other words, Congress cannot enact Fourteenth Amendment
legislation that creates a new source of substantive rights the Court has not read the
Amendment to provide. See McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 80–81.
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of Boerne applies to the Thirteenth Amendment.300 However,
lower courts that have interpreted City of Boerne have reasoned
that since the Court made no mention of Jones and its precedent
for Thirteenth Amendment interpretation, City of Boerne stands.301
Further, the City of Boerne rationale does not limit the Thirteenth
Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment is different from
the other Reconstruction Amendments. Although the three
Reconstruction Amendments have a singular “unity of
purpose”302—to establish and expand civil rights, especially but not
exclusively, for African Americans—each Amendment provided
different means to achieve this purpose.303 The Court, as early as
1883, declared this to be true, even while it sought to limit the
scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
powers.304
We must not forget that the province and scope of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments are different; the
former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited the States
from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States . . . . The amendments are different, and the
powers of Congress under them are different.305

These Amendments also differ in the nature of their targeted
action. The Fifteenth Amendment specifically provided African
Americans the right to vote.306 Further, whereas “[t]he prohibitions
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are largely upon the
acts of the states,” the Thirteenth Amendment “names no party or
authority,” in either section one or section two.307 The Court went
further to pronounce that “[t]he differences between the
[Amendments] have been so fully considered by this [C]ourt that it
is enough to refer to the decisions.”308
300. McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 102.
301. United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048–49 (D.N.M. 2011)
(upholding defendants’ conviction under the Hate Crimes Act for harassing and
assaulting a young disabled Navajo man).
302. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1873).
303. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
304. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
305. Id. Much of this reasoning has been expanded since 1883, as previously
mentioned, however it stands as a powerful signal of the distinctions between the
Thirteenth Amendment and its companion Reconstruction Amendments.
306. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
307. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216.
308. Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 23, 27).
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Even among modern scholars who fiercely debate Boerne’s
relevancy to the Thirteenth Amendment’s section two powers,
there remains agreement that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments differ with respect to their diverging focuses on state
versus private action.309 However, this debate only becomes
necessary to delve into, if the subject of Congressional action falls
outside the categories of “slavery” or “involuntary servitude.”
Certainly there is no disagreement that Congress may act in the
face of the Thirteenth Amendment’s direct prohibitions.310 When
this is the case, Congress is entitled, even compelled, to act under
its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers:
This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly selfexecuting without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms
are applicable to any existing state of circumstances . . . . Still,
legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various
cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe
proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And
such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for
the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws
establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part
of the United States.311

Unless and until Jones is overturned, the judiciary has defined,
in section one of the Thirteenth Amendment, the boundaries of
substantive rights that Congress is entitled to legislate against: its
rational determinations of its “badges and incidents” of slavery.312
309. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Congressional Authority to Interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 MD. L. REV. 60, 75 (2011)
[hereinafter McAward 2011]; Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret
the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40, 55 (2011) [hereinafter Tsesis 2011].
310. “Enslavement, involuntary servitude, or their modern equivalents [which]
are not ‘badges and incidents’ of slavery: they are slavery. The question of whether a
person suffers slavery’s lingering effects . . . is a different question from whether that
person is literally enslaved or compelled to labor on behalf of another.” Carter, supra
note 156, at 1365.
311. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
312. Mark, supra note 135, at 712–13. Professor McAward, in her article, argued
that the Jones precedent does leave to Congress the opportunity to alter the landscape
of section one’s grant of substantive rights. McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 137–38.
Professor McAward advocates for a more (but not the most) restrictive interpretation,
which would “revise Jones by clarifying that Congress’s discretion is limited to
identifying which badges and incidents of slavery it will address—not defining them
outright—and then determining how it will address them.” Id. at 142.
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However, since the modern debtors’ prison is peonage,313
prohibited as a form of involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress is compelled to legislate against the
practice.314
2. Federalism Issues Do Not Stand Up Against Violations of
the Thirteenth Amendment
Concerns about an expansive growth of federal power will
naturally arise following a proposal that Congress enact remedial
legislation prohibiting the modern debtors’ prison.315 Like the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Thirteenth
Amendment transformed the balance of power between the federal
government and the states, preempting state laws that create
conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude.316
Each
Amendment limited a state’s power to inhibit the civil rights of,
primarily African American, citizens.317 In passing the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Supremacy Clause318 took effect to shift the
power to acquiesce or invalidate slavery into the purview of the
federal government.319 Congress debated the federalism issue at
great length, but, ultimately passed the Thirteenth Amendment,
since, “[t]he principles of federalism had to yield to the moral
demands of abolition.”320 Therefore, in keeping with this purpose,
state and local policies which imprison individuals for nonpayment
of debt violate the Thirteenth Amendment and should be
invalidated over any countervailing federalism concerns.321
CONCLUSION
The existence of debtors’ prisons has plagued this nation since
its infancy. This new form of debt slavery, in which indigent
313. See supra Section II.A.
314. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1905) (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20).
315. See Kares, supra note 136, at 408–09.
316. George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1380–81 (2008).
317. Id.
318. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
319. Rutherglen, supra note 316, at 1380–81; see Kares, supra note 136, at 408–
09.
320. Rutherglen, supra note 316, at 1382; see Kares, supra note 136, at 382–84.
321. See generally Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158 (Va. 1968).

368

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:327

criminal defendants become inescapably indebted to the state,
defies the most basic values of human decency. While the Supreme
Court requires additional due process for indigent defendants,
these protections have failed to stem the tide of this epidemic.
However, it is precisely this institution the Thirteenth Amendment
was designed to prevent: a system that exploits the labor of poor
people, while the financially fortunate walk free. Congress, in the
face of such disparity, is compelled to act to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, and prove once and for all that today’s debtors’
prisons, an impermissible form of slavery and involuntary
servitude, have no place in a humane society.

